Owing to the WTO exemption that allows governments to subsidize arms exports, the arms trade is one of the few remaining areas of trade where we observe export subsidies. This paper examines the e¤ect of arms controls, in the form of licensing delays, on the incentives to subsidize arms exports and conversely the e¤ect of the WTO arms trade exemption on the incentives to break arms control agreements. Our main result is that arms controls and free trade commitments re-enforce each other. Licensing delays reduce the incentive to subsidise and free trade without subsidies reduces the bene…ts of a unilateral abrogation of arms controls. Transparency actually worsens the Nash ine¢ciencies at play in that incomplete information leads to lower subsidies and lower arms exports.
Introduction
The arms trade is an activity where foreign policy concerns such as security, human rights and international stability interact and often clash with economic concerns.
One manifestation of this tension is the fact that among main weapon exporters arms export controls often exist side-by-side with export subsidization. In the case of the UK, for example, arms export subsidies in the form of cheap loans and credit insurance guarantees for exporters constitute almost one third of the total volume of subsidies provided by the Exports Credit Guarantee Department which amounts to £9 billion (at 1995 prices) or almost 5% of the value of total exports 1 (see Martin, 1999 and Martin, 2001 ).
However, the relevance of arms export subsidies becomes much higher if we follow the de…nition of subsidy agreed by the World Trade Organization members (WTO) in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 2 (ASCM, article 1.1).
According to this criteria, an export subsidy to a …rm would include not only direct transfers of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusions) and potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guaranties) but also, indirect subsidies channeled through purchases of goods by the government, among others. Following For estimates of subsidies to arms exports through the use of export credit guarantees see Bagci et al. (2003) . 4 In many occasions, domestic sales are crucial to the existence of domestic defence …rms, they ensure that the …xed production costs and & costs of the …rm are covered. Still, one could consider that domestic defence procurement only constitutes a subsidy to the …rm if the price paid for such procurement is higher than the exports price. In our paper, the procurement price could Despite the fact that arms trade constitutes the …rst source of 'legal' trade in the world, the WTO has given an exemption to arms exports subsidies. Therefore, the categories of prohibited or actionable subsidies in the ASCM do not apply to arms exports. This exemption is recorded in the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT):
"...nothing in this Agreement shall be construed...to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests (i) relating to …ssionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the tra¢c in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such tra¢c in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations;..." (Article XXI, GATT, Security Exceptions).
Earlier work by the authors analyzed the regulation of arms exports and its relationship with procurement Levine, Mouzakis and Smith, 2000; García-Alonso, 1999) . In those papers, it was assumed that arms trade has a negative impact on the security of the exporting countries. This negative impact is justi…ed by the observation that arms exports can unstabilize regional arms races thereby creating con ‡ict situations that required external intervention or cause economic uncertainty 5 . In those papers, arms exports were regulated by means of direct controls such as export licenses, embargoes, etc. and there was no uncertainty facing the government. García-Alonso (2000) introduces a combination of indirect controls (R&D subsidies) and direct controls (export controls) to regulate arms trade.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of the WTO exemption, which allows governments to subsidize arms exports. Also, we analyze the addiin principle be higher or lower than the exports price.
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It is true that arms exports could sometimes increase the security perception of the exporter, say if those weapons are bought by an ally. If that was the case, direct export controls would be unlikely and therefore, our paper would not apply to that case. tional impact of informational asymmetries between governments and the weapon producers. In our analysis, we introduce both national defence procurement and price export subsidies as tools that governments use to regulate the arms export market. In doing so, we attempt to re ‡ect the variety of export subsidy tools which can still be used by weapon exporters 'thanks' to the WTO exception.
Defence procurement has a number of distinctive characteristics. Rogerson (1994) lists these as the importance of R&D, uncertainty, economies of scale and the role of governments as the sole purchasers. Large R&D and other …xed costs mean that suppliers need to sell on the international market in order to be commercially viable, however, security concerns may lead countries to limit the amount or quality of the exported weapons. This situation, where security concerns compete with economic concerns, is a further distinctive feature of the defence procurement process.
Uncertainty facing the procuring government can involve both demand and cost conditions. This is re ‡ected in the theoretical literature, which studies asymmetric information and incentive contracts that force …rms to reveal their private information (La¤ont and Tirole, 1993) . The seminal work of Brander and Spencer (1985) launched the strategic trade literature with the insight that strategic trade policies can exacerbate the Prisoner's Dilemma problem facing oligopolistic …rms; i.e., the Nash equilibrium quantity sold by each …rm is higher than the quantity they would each sell if they could form a cartel and multilateral government rent-seeking subsidies make this problem even worse for the …rms. A recent trade literature studies the impact of asymmetric information on optimal strategic trade policies. Maggi (1999) analyses how asymmetric information a¤ects strategic trade policies in a third market model. Our paper introduces direct government transfers to the …rm, payments for national procurement, as a policy tool. In this respect, our model is closer to Brainard and Martimort (1997) . In their paper, price export subsidies and direct transfers are combined to create a revelation mechanism that forces …rms to truthfully reveal their type when policymakers are incompletely informed. Due to the restriction on export subsidization imposed by the WTO in most industries, this model structure applies best to the existing regulatory framework in the exception -the arms industry. The direct transfers alluded to by Brainard and Martimort (1997) become the price paid for defence procurement by the government. However, if such model is to be applied to the arms trade, the security concerns which a¤ect this unique industry and the export controls that exporter governments put in place must also be considered.
In the case of the US, the world's leading arms exporter, the O¢ce of Defense . Even if a license is awarded in the end, the administrative compliance of these regulations imposes not only a delay in the receipt of export revenues but also a delay in the security costs involved in arms exports. This aspect of arms trade is re ‡ected in our paper.
Administrative delays in the concession of import licenses have been recently analyzed in Regibeau and Rochet (2001) . They consider the case in which an importing country may impose a delay on the foreign …rm in obtaining approval for sale of a particular product, as opposed to the domestic …rm. Administrative delays are presented as non-tari¤ barriers to trade. In our case, the administrative delay has a very di¤erent ‡avour; it applies to exporters and its main objective is to increase national security.
In this paper we show that arms controls and free trade commitments re-enforce each other. Licensing delays reduce the incentive to subsidise and free trade without subsidies reduces the bene…ts of a unilateral abrogation of arms controls. Furthermore, we show that transparency actually worsens the Nash ine¢ciencies at play in 6 For up to date information on defence export controls in the US check: http://www.pmdtc.org/ that incomplete information leads to lower subsidies and lower arms exports.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an arms trade model in which government or regulator procures a defence good from a sole national supplier who also sells in the world market. Weapon exporters compete in a Cournot fashion in the exports market. Governments regulate arms trade using a combination of policy tools: …rst they pay for national procurement, second they subsidize/tax the exports price, third they have controls on arms exports in the form of administrative delays, which a¤ect both exports revenue and security. Section 3 considers a complete information structure, where the regulator knows the cost function of the …rm and demand conditions and can therefore anticipate the …rm's choice of exports. In section 4, we contrast this benchmark case with the incomplete information set-up where the exporting …rms possess private information regarding their cost structure. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Model
In each of  countries, a government or regulator procures a defence good from a sole national supplier who also sells in the world market. Label countries  = 1   and refer to variables in country  with a subscript . To ease the notational burden, we omit the subscript in country 1. In that country, output is  =  +  units where  is purchased by the government at a price  and  is exported,  is held …xed in the analysis. In the international market for arms, the price is  (), where  is world output. Total costs, consisting of …xed and variable costs, given by
where  are …xed costs and  denotes marginal costs.
Since  is …xed, the payment  is in e¤ect a lump-sum transfer from the government to the …rm 7
. In addition we allow the government two additional instruments:
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Our assumption of a …xed amount of domestic procurement is not a strong one given that our marginal production costs are assumed to be constant. If the government chose  and left  a per-unit export subsidy  (or tax if   0) paid (as with the lump-sum transfer) when production is completed, and a licensing delay  . The latter is the form that the export regime takes and reduces the current value of $1 of arms revenue to the exporting …rm to $ 1 (1 + )  = $, say, where  is the rate of discount. Then assuming that the exported military good paid for at the time of delivery, the single-period expected payo¤ for the …rm is
Given the level of procurement, , in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium …rms then choose output to be exported given the aggregate output of all competitors in the international market.
Total world exports give rise to a security externality modelled as follows. Let the current value of security of producer country 1 associated with procurement  and world exports  with delay  be ( );
captures the existence of negative security externality as a result of aggregate arms exports to the world market, from the viewpoint of each producer.
Then a utilitarian form of the social welfare of producer country 1 is
where (1 + ) is the social cost of a unit of taxation.
Substituting for  +  from (2), (3) can be written
Given the level of procurement, , and the multilateral arms control regime in place re ‡ected in the value of  · 1, the regulator's choice variables are the procurement price  and the per-unit export subsidy 8 , . These instruments are chosen subject to a participation or individual rationality constraint ¸0.
unchanged, we would still have a direct transfer to the …rm as such decision is taken prior to the …rm's exports choice.
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This subsidy is endogenously chosen and can therefore take any value, including and negative value, in which case we would have an exports tax.
Under complete information, the regulator knows the cost function of the …rm and demand conditions and can therefore anticipate the …rm's choice of exports.
We contrast this benchmark case with the following principal-agent problem: Given procurement , the government chooses its price  and the export subsidy  but cannot observe marginal cost parameter   in country . The distribution of the   however is public knowledge to all countries. In choosing a procurement price and subsidy the government now faces an adverse selection problem.
This problem is closest to the Brainard and Martimort (1997) case with a zeropro…t participation constraint. They assume di¤erentiated goods; here we have a homogeneous good, but also a security e¤ect. We also allow for arms control in the form of a licensing delay and for regulators with di¤erent preferences over consumer surplus and …rm pro…ts. We now examine the complete and incomplete information problems in turn.
Arms Exports under Complete Information

First-Best Choice of Arms Exports
As a bench-mark we …rst calculate …rst-best (FB), the choice of arms exports and rent for each country that would be chosen by a utilitarian world social planner. The mythical social planner has direct control over arms exports is constrained only by the …rms' participation constraints and has no need for licensing delay. We therefore set  = 1. Total arms exports are chosen to maximize P  =1   where   is the social welfare of the  country. In this section, we …rst study symmetric equilibria. Then for the …rst-best, putting   = , this amounts to maximizing
with respect to  and  subject to the individual rationality condition (IR), ¸0.
Clearly the latter binds,  = 0 and  =    is given by the …rst order condition:
From this point onwards we restrict ourselves to the following linear functional forms for the functions (¢) and  (¢)where  represents the weighting that exports have on the security perception of the exporters:
Assuming these functional forms and (1) for (), the social welfare function (5) becomes
where total arms exports 9  =  +  ¡1 =   +  ¡ . Then the …rst order condition (6) yields the …rst-best choice of exports for each of the  identical countries:
The Constrained Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
Now consider the independent design of an arms export subsidy and procurement programme when a licensing delay regime is in force. The following timing of the game is now crucial:
1. Each government commits itself to a given arms export licensing delay, possibly within a multilateral agreement, implying a discount factor  = We use the standard notation:
. Firms export with a delay  and receive the current value of  dollars for each dollar of arms export revenue.
The appropriate equilibrium concept for this dynamic game with complete information is a subgame perfect equilibrium, found by backward induction. Starting at stage 4, given  and  decided previously, given  which we take as exogenous, and given the output of all other …rms  ¡1 , the …rm in country 1 maximizes, with respect to , pro…ts given by (2). Substituting our chosen functional forms this
The …rst order condition for this optimization problem is
For country  the corresponding reaction function is
Hence we have
Now note that
. In addition, since the countries are identical in structure, we have that  ¡1 = ( ¡ 1) and  ¡1 = ( ¡ 1). Hence (14) becomes
Using (12) and (15) we can solve for the Nash equilibrium of stage 3 of the game to obtain:
In ( Proceeding to stage 3 of the game, the outside option of the …rm to choose not to participate imposes the participation constraint ¸0. At stage 2, in a Nash equilibrium of this stage of the game, the regulator in country 1 chooses  and  so as to maximize its social welfare given by (5), given the choice of subsidies by the other regulators,  ¡1 , and given the participation constraint. The latter must bind, and the regulator chooses the price of the procured good,  at its minimum value to ensure this. Hence putting  = 0 in (5), and using our assumed functional forms, we can write the social welfare function in country 1 as
where we note that a licensing delay also a¤ects the security. The optimal subsidy for country 1, given  ¡1 , must now satisfy the …rst-order condition:
To complete the solution we …rst note from (16) that
and from (15) that
Bringing together (18), (19) and (21) we arrive at the equilibrium level of exports with subsidies constrained by the arms export regime in the form of a licensing delay:
Comparing (22) and (16), some algebra leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (i) Arms exports are higher under a subsidies programme (
(ii) At the threshold value of the security parameter ¸¹ , subsidies disappear and give way to a tax on exports.
(iii) Since from (i) ¹  is an increasing function of , the e¤ect of strengthening export controls (reducing ) is to lower the threshold ¹  and therefore discourage subsidies as well as arms exports.
To understand these results let us …rst imagine countries in the no subsidy state ( =  ¡1 = 0). A single country acting unilaterally can improve its situation by acting as a Stackelberg Leader both with respect to its own …rm and the other countries. Introducing a subsidy will result in higher exports by its own …rm and, in the absence of retaliation by other countries, lower exports by its rivals, and therefore higher market share. By choosing a subsidy at stage 2 of the game on its reaction function at that stage, the country unambiguously bene…ts. However this outcome is not an equilibrium. When other countries act is a similar fashion setting subsidies simultaneously, the Nash equilibrium of stage 2 is an example of a 'Prisoners' Dilemma': all countries subsidize, providing that the security parameter  is below the threshold given in (23), market shares are equal and all countries export more taking the equilibrium further away from the …rst-best
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. From (16) the equilibrium subsidy is then given by
Thus relaxing arms controls (i.e., reducing ) encourages a higher subsidy and more 10 Note that our model with  = 0 is very close to the strategic trade literature models, therefore, the result that countries would then give export subsidies if acting in a noncooperative fashion is not surprising (see Brander and Spencer (1985) ). This result is not reversed unless the security concern  is high enough to o¤set the pro…t incentive behind the subsidy.
arms exports. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Under complete information governments pay a procurement price that just satis…es the …rm's participation (or IR) constraint. As exports rise average costs fall and this threshold procurement price also falls. The welfare 'return' on subsidies, which must be …nanced out of distortionary taxes, arises from this reduction in the procurement price. As export controls are relaxed this welfare return from a subsidy increases, thus increasing its optimal value in equilibrium.
If countries cooperate then the …rst-best can be supported by the negative subsidy (i.e., a tax):
In the absence of cooperation if   ¹  then the security threat is such that subsidies give way to taxes. From (23) the threshold ¹  is a decreasing function of  resulting in (ii) of the proposition.
The Two-Country Case
In the next section of the paper, we assume incomplete information and we introduce asymmetries between countries so that parameters   ,   ,   ,   ,   ,   and   ,  =   are country-speci…c. Then, to ease the exposition, we restrict ourselves to two countries, say 'home' () and 'foreign' ( ). We will compare the incomplete information outcome with that under the benchmark of complete information which, following a similar analysis to that above, has a subgame perfect equilibrium in exports, (     ) given by
which reduces to (22) if  = 2 and parameters are equal in the two countries. The subsidies that support (26) are given by
An important consideration for arms control regimes is their stability given that a single country can bene…t from unilaterally relaxing or abandoning its arms control.
That is, the -country can bene…t from increasing   . Using (9), for the -country we can write the welfare as
In a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, (29) is maximized with respect to   , given   .
Now write (29) as
. Then partially di¤erentiating with respect to   we have that
(30) provides a measure of the incentive of the -country to relax its arms control policy by allowing the licensing delay to decrease (i.e., increasing   ).
The demand and cost structure chosen for the model (linear demand functions and constant marginal cost) has the property that in asymmetric equilibrium with .
Maximum equilibrium output is reached in the subsidy regime where there are no security concerns ( = 0). Then from (22) with n=2, the maximum output in a symmetric equilibrium is   =
2(¡) 5
. Hence we must restrict parameters to those
or in other words   8 3
. The following propositions requires that we strengthen this condition to:
We can now prove the proposition:
Proposition 2 For small deviations in   about a symmetrical equilibrium with   =   , if condition (31) holds and   ¹  then:
 and therefore the ability to subsidise exports has the e¤ect of destabilising the arms control regime.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is similar to the previous proposition. The welfare gain from relaxing arms controls arises from the increased revenue (assuming condition (31) holds) in current value terms, from exports. This may be welfareenhancing because it reduces the procurement price required to satisfy the …rm's participation constraint, a bene…t which must be weighed against the negative security e¤ect from increased exports. If (31) holds, the former outweighs the latter.
In a trade regime that allows subsidies, revenue from exports rises more than the negative security e¤ect. The bene…t of a unilateral abrogation of the arms control regime correspondingly rises, making the regime less stable.
Arms Exports under Incomplete Information
We now assume that the governments cannot observe the marginal cost parameter   in country  =   which constitute asymmetric information only known to the …rm in question. The distribution of the   however is public knowledge. We con…ne ourselves to a multilateral agreement with equal licensing delays; i.e.,   =   = .
In choosing a procurement price and subsidy, the government now faces an adverse selection problem. The sequencing of events is now:
1. Each government commits itself to a given arms export licensing delay implying a discount factor  = 1 (1 + )  . 2. Each government  =   independently designs a revelation mechanism consisting of mappings   =   (  ) (implying a lump-sum     ) and a subsidy   =   (  ) to induce truthful reporting and participation.
3. Firms choose whether or not to participate.
Firms report
5. Given   and   , …rms choose output including exports   ;  =  .
6. Firms export with a delay  and receive the current value $ for each $ of arms export revenue.
The appropriate equilibrium concept is now a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). To solve for the PBE, we …rst solve for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of stage 5:
Stage 5. The Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Proceeding as for the complete information game between symmetric economies above, with subsidies and procurement prices set in both countries, each …rm  =   maximizes   with respect to   taking the output of its foreign rival as given. This leads to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium:
Stage 4: Truthful Reporting
Given the mechanism   =   (  ) and   =   (  ), if …rm  reports  and …rm  reports truthfully (which happens in equilibrium), then …rm  produceŝ
say, and receives rent
which depends on both   and   . The home …rm knows its own e¢ciency parameter
which is known to all players in the game. Then at stage 4 before revelation, …rm  will choose its report  to maximize expected rent over the distribution of   given by
Truthful reporting (i.e., incentive compatibility) then requires "
To proceed further we need to restrict the density function. We assume a uniform distribution and two extreme cases:   and   either perfectly correlated or completely independent. For the case of perfectly correlated shocks
, and zero otherwise. Then
For the case of independently distributed
expected pro…ts for the home …rm after reporting  are given by
Now consider the incentive compatibility constraint (39) for these two cases. For
But from (36) we have that
. Hence (42) becomes
With truthful reporting,  (  ) =   ( ), given by (32). If   =   = , the latter is a function of only  and we can di¤erentiate to obtain
using (32). Combining (43) and (44) we arrive at the …nal form of the incentive compatibility constraint for the home country when   =   :
For   independent, (43) and (44) are replaced with
and hence from (46) and (47)the …nal form of the incentive compatibility constraint for the home country when   and   are independent is:
Stage 2. Mechanism Design
Given   and   , the social welfare function of the form (4) for the home country is
The home policy maker then designs a mechanism to maximise
subject to the   and the participation constraint:
First consider   =   = . Then the mechanism maximizes
subject to the   constraint, (48), and the participation constraint, which now becomes   ( ))¸0 for all . This optimization problem is carried out using Pontryagin's maximum principle. De…ne the Hamiltonian
Let the control variables be   and   . Then writing   as a function of these control variable, the …rst-order conditions for a maximum are:
and the transversality condition () = 0. Some manipulation then leads to
Assuming a uniform distribution, integrating (56) and imposing the transversality condition gives
Hence from (56) and (58) we arrive at
Similarly for the  country
Substituting for   and   from the Nash equilibrium at stage 3 we arrive at the following di¤erential equations for the subsidies in the two countries:
We look for solutions to these two di¤erential equations of the form
where    are the subsidies under complete information found by solving (27). Con…ning ourselves to the symmetrical case   =   =  etc., substituting (63) into (61) gives
Thus from (63) and (64) we see that    
 
and   is a decreasing function of   .
We summarise our results as follows:
For the symmetrical case where all parameters such as   are the same in the two countries, the presence of asymmetric information leads to lower subsidies, lower exports and a lower security threshold ¹  at which subsidies cease compared with the complete information case.
For completely independent   the analysis goes through in a similar fashion arriving at static equations for the subsidies
Taking expectations, this gives us two equations in
, found by taking expectations of (27), and    (  ) and    (  ). Proceeding as before the solution is given by
where for the symmetrical case (other than the   ) we have
11 Note (64) agrees with equation (24) of Brainard and Martimort (1997) .
Thus the proposition:
Proposition 4
Asymmetric information reduces subsidies more on average (i.e., across all realisations of the   parameters) when the parameters   are independently distributed.
The intuition behind propositions 3 and 4 is as follows. Asymmetric information reduces the incentive to subsidize because part of this transfer is absorbed as rent by the more e¢cient …rm in order to induce truthful reporting of their private information. This 'screening e¤ect' reduces subsidies and exports in equilibrium, so less transparency in workings of the arms producers is actually a good thing. If the unobserved e¢ciency parameters in the two countries are independently distributed rather than equal, then the screening costs rise and the downward e¤ect on subsidies is strengthened further.
Conclusions
This paper applies the tools of the strategic trade literature to the international trade in arms. Owing to the WTO exemption this is probably the only area of trade where we observe lump-sum and per unit transfers to exports. We have examined the e¤ect of arms controls, in the form of licensing delays, on the incentives to subsidize arms exports and conversely the e¤ect of the WTO arms trade exemption on the incentives to break arms control agreements. Our main result is that arms controls and free trade commitments re-enforce each other. Licensing delays reduce the incentive to subsidize and free trade without subsidies reduces the bene…ts of a unilateral abrogation of arms controls. Transparency actually worsens the Nash ine¢ciencies at play in that incomplete information leads to lower subsidies and lower arms exports. If and when the defence industry becomes more transparent, then the abolition of the WTO exemption becomes more urgent.
In our paper, the impact of transparency on security is determined by the type of information asymmetry introduced. We assume that the government is uncertain about a cost parameter. Other types of asymmetry could be considered, one of them being the actual quality or quantity of weapons being exported by either the domestic …rm or its competitors. This type of asymmetry is likely to have a very di¤erent impact on security and this topic is the purpose of further research.
A Proof of Proposition 2
From (29) we have that
In a symmetric equilibrium, putting   =   =  etc, for the subsidy and no-subsidy cases we have:
Substituting (A.2) to (A.9) into (A.1) a little algebra proves results (i) and (ii) in proposition 2.
